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Paul Smart’s and Robert Clowes’s “Intellectual Virtues and Internet-Extended Knowledge” 
(2021) in response to my “Online Intellectual Virtues and the Extended Mind” (2020) raises 
some important questions for the proposal of intellectual virtues in an online environment. 
These questions aim both at the motivation for a virtue responsibilist reaction to the 
Internet, and at my success of combining virtue responsibilism and cognitive integration. 
Moreover, they suggest that there might be a better way to take up virtue responsibilist ideas 
when we focus on how people judge online sources to be trustworthy. I am in much 
agreement with the general directions of their questions, but I take the lessons to be slightly 
different. In general, I remain more hopeful for the role of online intellectual virtues as 
proposed by Heersmink (2018). 
 
The structure of this reply closely follows Smart’s and Clowes’s presentation. I will first 
reassess the motivation behind online intellectual virtues. Then, second, I address worries 
about whether we can avoid the generalized extended knowledge dilemma by choosing a 
multidimensional framework for cognitive integration. Finally, I will discuss Smart’s and 
Clowes’s positive proposal in the third part. 
 
How Important are Online Epistemic Hazards in the Call for Intellectual Virtues? 
 
My initial contribution paints a picture that is well-known in discussions of epistemic aspects 
of the Internet. I start by observing that the Internet as an epistemic source brings about 
some epistemically harmful consequences: misinformation (Lynch, 2016), reproducing 
harmful stereotypes (Noble, 2018), filter bubbles and echo chambers (Simpson, 2012; Miller 
and Record, 2013; Nguyen, 2020; Cinelli, De Francisci Morales, Galeazzi, Quattrociocchi, 
and Starnini, 2021). Barely any mentioning of the positive sides of the Internet as a source of 
knowledge. With the Internet as an epistemically hostile place in mind, I then propose online 
intellectual virtues as the antidote that can help us bypass all the epistemic hazards. These 
online intellectual virtues are instances of more general intellectual virtues (e.g., curiosity, 
open-mindedness, etc.) applied to an online environment. These virtues are suggested to 
safeguard us from the epistemic hazards found on the Internet. 
 
Smart and Clowes rightfully ask us to stop for a moment and reconsider whether this is an 
adequate characterization of the Internet. Should we start with all the epistemic hazards in 
mind? Are we selling the epistemic benefits too short by focusing on all these hazards? They 
suggest that we should look at different ways the Internet can be used, and that it is not so 
obvious whether the Internet in general can be classified as an epistemically hostile 
environment if we look closely enough. 
 
I agree with their suggestions. Moreover, I agree that evaluating the Internet as an epistemic 
source is a difficult task that cannot be done by locking in only on Google Search. So in this 
regard, my discussion of online intellectual virtues and the extended mind was incomplete. 
Smart and Clowes also point out that even for Google Search it is difficult to assess which 
epistemic hazards are present. Here we are confronted with a general methodological 
problem when we deal with Google Search and the speed at which it can change. What was 






result is published and discussed the algorithms change soon afterwards, often in a way that 
makes it impossible to tell from the outside what exactly changed. Did the algorithm become 
better at avoiding stereotypes, or did it just become better at hiding well-known instances of 
prejudice? 
  
This is a challenge for me (and Heersmink 2018) to the extent that we motivate online 
intellectual virtues as a response to empirically evidenced problems. There are at least two 
plausible ways to go from here. First, we can generalize from previous problems to the 
likelihood of yet to be discovered problems. Given that so far we have always found 
problems sooner or later, we should adopt online intellectual virtues as a safeguard. I am 
unsure whether this is a good way to go. I prefer a different route. We can, second, provide 
an argument for online intellectual virtues that is independent of epistemic hazards on the 
Internet. Let me sketch such an argument. 
 
Intellectual virtues, such as intellectual carefulness, are thought of as acquired character traits 
that can be described as a mean between two vices. Being intellectually timid, afraid to form 
beliefs even when it would be appropriate, is a vice. Being intellectually careless, too quick in 
forming beliefs even when it is inappropriate, is a vice on the other extreme. The 
intellectually careful agent shows the right amount of care given the concrete situation at 
hand. What exactly the right amount of care is will be difficult to tell, but clearly, in an 
epistemically hostile environment much more care is called for than in an epistemically 
friendly environment. However—and this is the important point—even epistemically 
friendly environments call for intellectual carefulness. Intellectual virtues are not meant 
exclusively for hostile environments. They aim to characterize epistemic agents and their 
performances in general. An intellectually careful agent will be appropriately careful given the 
environment. If they were overly careful in an epistemically friendly environment, they 
would not act virtuously. 
 
This discussion of intellectual carefulness generalizes to online intellectual virtues. Once we 
see these as virtues that aim for a mean between two vices and we recognize that this mean 
is dependent on the concrete situation, it becomes clear that we need online intellectual 
virtues even if there were no epistemic hazards on the Internet. We do not need these online 
intellectual virtues only as a safeguard against hazards, but we need them to engage with the 
Internet in a virtuous way in general. Suppose Wikipedia is an epistemically friendly part of 
the Internet because of mechanisms that ensure the reliability of Wikipedia, as can be argued 
with Halfaker and Riedl (2012) and Tollefson (2009). To make full use of this favorable 
environment a user needs to be appropriately trusting of Wikipedia. If a user is overly 
skeptical of Wikipedia they will miss out on many true beliefs. What the virtuous user needs 
is the right amount of carefulness, which in this case amounts to not questioning Wikipedia 
too frequently. Being overly skeptical is being too careful and hence intellectually vicious. 
This gives us an argument for online intellectual virtues based on the Internet as an 
epistemically friendly environment. An intellectually virtuous user of Wikipedia will be no 
more and no less careful than is appropriate, and will be so at least partially in virtue of their 
background knowledge of Wikipedia. 
 
Smart and Clowes are right to push back against the overly pessimistic picture of the 
Internet that often motivates online intellectual virtues. But the lesson to take away is not 
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about the Internet was not necessary to motivate online intellectual virtues in the first place. 
Even the most favorable environments require virtuous agents.   
 
Avoiding the Generalized Extended Knowledge Dilemma 
 
With this new motivation for online intellectual virtues in place, I can now look at the 
challenge posed by Smart and Clowes to my attempt of combining these virtues with 
Heersmink’s (2015) multidimensional approach to cognitive integration. Given that Clark’s 
and Chalmers’s (1998) version of the extended mind thesis does not go well with online 
intellectual virtues, I suggested that Heersmink’s version fares better. Heersmink proposes a 
multitude of dimensions on which we can evaluate the integration of an artifact: Information 
Flow, Reliability, Durability, Trust, Procedural Transparency, Informational Transparency, 
Individualization, Transformation. 
 
Whereas Clark and Chalmers require the automatic endorsement of information that is 
provided by the external artifact, Heersmink is not committed to such a condition. In his 
framework, an artifact can be overall highly integrated without high integration on the trust 
dimension, and hence without automatic endorsement. As long as the artifact is still 
sufficiently integrated on the non-trust dimensions we can have an overall extended mind. 
My suggestion was that this is exactly what we look for to combine online intellectual virtues 
with a version of the extended mind thesis. An agent with online intellectual virtues can 
cognitively integrate a website highly on most dimensions without much integration on the 
trust dimension. Tentatively stated, “there might be room for combinations of agents and 
artifacts that still count as showing an overall high degree of cognitive integration while 
being virtuous epistemic agents” (Schwengerer 2020, 8). 
 
Smart and Clowes doubt that this approach succeeds and provide two examples to illustrate 
their reasoning. In a nutshell, they worry that the dimensions besides trust also bring about 
problems for virtuous agents, which they capture in the generalized extended knowledge 
dilemma. 
 
The Extended Knowledge Dilemma (Generalized) 
 
The properties that work to ensure that an external resource can be treated 
as a candidate for cognitive incorporation are also, at least in some cases, the 
very same properties that work to undermine or endanger the positive 
epistemic standing of the technologically-extended agent (Smart and Clowes 
2021, 17). 
 
If they are right, then just making sure that integration on the trust dimension stays 
appropriately low will not be enough to make us virtuous agents. In the worst case, we also 
need less integration on other dimensions to be virtuous, effectively giving up on having 
extended minds. I remain more hopeful. 
 
If I want to endorse both online intellectual virtues and a version of the extended mind 






multidimensional approach provides the theoretical tools to do just that. If some of the 
dimensions can be epistemically neutral, then they can contribute to cognitive integration 
without endangering the epistemic standing and intellectual virtues. Implicitly I made such a 
suggestion when I proposed to keep integration on the trust dimension low, but be highly 
integrated on the other dimensions of Heersmink’s framework. I committed myself to the 
idea that only the trust dimension is relevant for online intellectual virtues. Smart and Clowes 
argue that other dimensions are epistemically relevant as well, pointing to individualization 
and the relation of processing fluency to the transparency dimensions. I agree that 
individualization and fluency affect agents and their intellectual virtues, but I think there is a 
way to conceptualize this effect without giving up on the possibility of extended agents with 
online intellectual virtues. I can analyze the effect at least in two different ways: 
 
(1) Individualization and transparency directly influence our epistemic states, and 
therefore they make us less intellectually virtuous.  
 
(2) Individualization and transparency influence trust and trust influences our 
epistemic states. Hence, properties belonging to the trust dimension make us 
less intellectually virtuous. 
 
Smart and Clowes seem to opt for (1), but the same processes can be conceptualized 
according to (2). And following my suggestions in Online Intellectual Virtues and the Extended 
Mind (2) still gives a person enough room to be intellectually virtuous and have an extended 
mind. If different dimensions become epistemically efficacious only by going through the 
trust dimension then it would be in principle possible to keep integration on the trust 
dimension appropriately low, while ranking highly on all other dimensions. All we need to 
do is to stop the influence of non-trust dimensions on the trust dimension. This leaves me 
with two main questions: Why should we take (2) over (1)? And even if it is in principle 
possible to keep integration on the trust dimension appropriately low, is it also possible in 
practice? 
 
The former question is difficult to answer in a general manner. Partially this is the result of 
some vagueness with the notion of trust involved.1 Heersmink introduces the trust 
dimension as follows: 
 
The notion of trust in the literature on EMT concerns our attitude towards 
the truth value of information. When we trust information, we typically think 
it is true. When we distrust information, we either think it is false or we are 
not sure whether it is true (Heersmink 2015, 587).  
 
Heersmink provides further analysis of explicit and implicit trust but does not give us a more 
concrete, general definition. My short characterization of this dimension follows Heersmink 
and holds that trust captures the degree to which one takes the information provided by an 
artifact to be correct (Schwengerer, 2020, p. 7). If we accept this conception of the trust 
dimension it seems to be the only dimension that is related to an assessment of truth. If this 
 
1 Coincidentally a reviewer for my initial paper (2020) already pointed to this vagueness of the notion of trust in 
play in the extended mind debates. I think they are right that the notion of trust is often underspecified. 
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is right, then any change to assessing the truth value of information functions via the trust 
dimension. That might give us the first indication in favor of (2).  
 
A different approach in favor of (2) can be motivated by looking at the empirical evidence 
that Smart and Clowes themselves point out. They (as Smart 2018a already did in his) worry 
about processing fluency effects that show that a procedural transparency dimension 
influences our judgments and therefore our epistemic states.2  It is well established that the 
speed and ease of processing information influences epistemic states (Alter and 
Oppenheimer, 2009). But processing fluency effects cannot establish (1).  
 
Instead, the empirical evidence (e.g. Reber and Schwarz 1999) for epistemically relevant 
processing fluency effects point to a change in judgments of truth due to processing fluency. 
Applying this to interactions with an artifact in Heersmink’s framework, I take it that the 
causal origin of processing fluency effects can be located in the dimension of procedural 
transparency. However, the effect itself is not located in the procedural transparency 
dimension. The change in judgments of truth is part of the trust dimension—it changes the 
degree to which one takes the information provided by an artifact to be correct. Hence, 
there is no need to adjust the procedural transparency dimension, as long as we find ways to 
keep integration on the trust dimension appropriately low. The threat of the generalized 
extended knowledge dilemma can thus be avoided. 
 
I remain hopeful that a similar strategy can be applied to other proposed examples of 
dimensions other than trust directly influencing the epistemic states of an extended agent. 
For instance personalization of Google Search can qualify as high individualization, but is in 
itself no problem as long as the trust dimension is kept appropriately low. Only if 
individualization leads to an inappropriate integration on the trust dimension intellectual 
virtues are threatened. 
 
So far I have been defending that in principle intellectually virtuous extended agents are 
possible. But perhaps Smart and Clowes are more worried that this possibility cannot be 
achieved in practice. Even if (2) is the best way to go, we still often end up with higher 
integration on the trust dimension than is appropriate because some of the other dimensions 
increase trust in an artifact in a way that is not warranted. The result is an extended, but not 
particularly virtuous agent. Here I agree with the worries. For extended agents to be 
intellectually virtuous we need to prevent the trust dimension from being inappropriately 
manipulated by the other dimensions. We need to find ways in which we can stop or 
compensate that high integration on a non-trust dimension can increase integration on the 
trust dimension. This is an open challenge, but I remain hopeful that it can be met.3 
 
A Different Place for Virtue Responsibilism? 
 
Smart and Clowes suggest an alternative place for virtue responsibilist accounts. They 
propose that intellectual virtues are relevant for judgments on the trustworthiness of artifacts 
 
2 Roughly, the degree of fluency and effortlessness in interacting with an artifact. 







and therefore play a role in deciding whether we should cognitively integrate an artifact. 
Hence they state: 
 
In short, we see a role for intellectual virtue in the acquisition of a particular 
kind of knowledge, namely, knowledge about the trustworthiness (or 
reliability) of particular online systems for particular epistemic purposes. It is 
this knowledge that makes the automatic endorsement of online content 
epistemically justified. […] We can accept that intellectual virtue plays a 
causal (developmental) role in the formation of extended epistemic systems, 
but we do not need to see the exercise of intellectual virtue as an intrinsic 
part of the operation of such systems (Smart and Clowes 2021, 18). 
 
I agree that intellectual virtues are important to acquire knowledge about the trustworthiness 
of particular online systems—or artifacts more generally. Hence, I am on board with their 
positive proposal. However, I take this to be a supplemental approach to online intellectual 
virtues as proposed by Heersmink (2018) and myself. Intellectual virtues can be important 
for both knowing which online systems to trust, and for engaging with these systems in an 
epistemically appropriate way. And there is a clear path on how these two interact.  
 
Think back to intellectual virtues as traits located at a mean between two vices, such as 
intellectual carefulness between timidness and carelessness. Intellectual virtues have no static 
mean, but rather depend on the situation one is in. Some situations demand that one is more 
careful, some call for being less careful. The intellectually virtuous agent is as careful as the 
situation demands. However, this requires a judgment on how careful one ought to be in the 
situation. And this is the place for knowledge about the trustworthiness of particular online 
systems. So I suggest thinking of our engagement with online systems in two steps, in both 
of which intellectual virtues find a home. First, intellectual virtues have a role in acquiring 
knowledge about the trustworthiness of a particular online system. Then, second, intellectual 
virtues have a role in regulating our operation of the online system guided by the prior 




I want to end with one final consideration that Smart and Clowes bring up and that only 
found its way in the final sentence of my initial paper (Schwengerer 2020, 10): online 
intellectual virtues can help us to navigate epistemic hazards in an online environment, but 
they must not become an excuse for us to ignore engagement with the Internet on a societal 
level. Smart and Clowes worry that “[t]he virtue responsibilist assumes that it is individual 
citizens who ought to be responsible for their own cyber-epistemic well-being” (Smart and 
Clowes 2021, 9). I do not think this is quite fair to virtue responsibilist, although I do agree 
that the position sometimes presents itself implicitly with individualist leanings, and that 
there is a risk that these leanings lead to an unproductive way to approach the epistemology 
of the Internet (cf. Smart 2018b, 53). I explicitly reject those leanings.  
 
Virtue responsibilism does not need to shift responsibility only to individuals. Instead, it can 
and should be just one part of an overall strategy to understand and improve our epistemic 
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governmental regulations of online systems.4 What we aim for is not only that our 
engagement with websites is virtuous. We also want the Internet to be an epistemically 
friendly environment, one in which being virtuous allows for a trusting attitude. Regardless 
of whether we have online intellectual virtues, an epistemically friendly online environment 
requires a different kind of intervention—a change in society, not individuals. 
 
Overall there is much agreement between Smart and Clowes and me. They provide an 
important contribution that pushes back on some assumptions that need much more 
attention. We need a broader focus on epistemological aspects of the Internet, and we 
should not overemphasize epistemic hazards. Moreover, the virtue responsibilist approach to 
the Internet has to do more work to show that it can be combined with a version of the 
extended mind thesis. I am hopeful that this can be done, and that Heersmink’s 
multidimensional framework provides us with the theoretical grounds to achieve that. But 
there is a large gap between what a framework allows in principle, and whether we can be 
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